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AbstrAct
This article discusses the impact of nafta on the Mexican film industry with special emphasis 
on the effects of neoliberal ideology, both on film audiences and its contents. It describes an in-
dustry that caters exclusively to the economic elites, blindly following the logic of economic 
optimization and foregoing any attempt at a cinematic project rooted in national culture. The 
author then analyzes Alonso Ruizpalacios’ Güeros (2014) as an interesting case study illustrat-
ing the difficulties of trying to resist neoliberalism after decades of living in a society and working 
inside a film industry strongly shaped by its ideology. 
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resumen 
Este artículo discute el impacto que ha tenido el Tratado de Libre Comercio de América del 
Norte (tlcan) en la industria cinematográfica mexicana, con un énfasis especial en los efectos 
de la ideología neoliberal, tanto en las audiencias como en los contenidos. El trabajo describe 
una industria que sirve exclusivamente a las elites económicas y que sigue a ciegas la lógica de 
la optimización financiera, dejando de lado cualquier iniciativa cinematográfica con raíces en la 
cultura nacional. El autor analiza la película Güeros (2014), de Alonso Ruiz Palacios, como un 
interesante estudio de caso que ilustra las dificultades que se enfrentan al tratar de resistirse al 
neoliberalismo, tras décadas de vivir en una sociedad y de trabajar en una industria fuerte-
mente modeladas por esa ideología. 
Palabras clave: cine mexicano, neoliberalismo, tlcan, ideología, Güeros.
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IntroductIon
Neoliberalism is perhaps most readily identified as a set of economic policies that 
emphasize free trade through deregulation, privatization, and fiscal austerity. From 
the 1970s on, these policies have shaped the economic and social orders of almost every 
country in the world with what can at best be described as mixed results. There has 
been economic growth in some places for some periods of time, but there have 
also been crises, economic inequality, social fragmentation, and increasingly precari-
ous working conditions. 
But neoliberalism is more than just a set of policies; it is an ideology, a whole 
world view that shapes not only our living conditions, but also ourselves, affecting 
our identities, aspirations, and moral values. And this is where things get tricky, since 
neoliberalism is not only an outside phenomenon to support or reject, but a force that 
impinges upon our subjectivity, making it hard, even for those who fervently op-
pose it, to imagine a viable alternative.
Mexico’s history with neoliberalism is pretty typical for a Third World country. 
Driven by a financial crisis and a long history of corrupt and repressive governments, 
in the late 1980s its people welcomed the neoliberal prospect of less government 
with some enthusiasm at first, but soon, after the inevitable disappointment, with a 
kind of resignation to its inescapability. Mexico’s incorporation into world markets 
became official in 1994, with the signing of the North American Free Trade Agree-
ment (nafta), but it had begun a few years earlier, with a process of privatization and 
deregulation of its main industries. Among those affected was the film industry, 
which was state owned and operated, and, therefore, in need of a complete overhaul 
in order to comply with nafta’s legal requirements, and perhaps more importantly, 
with its ideological dictums.
This overhaul dictated a smaller role for government in film production, a re-
duction of screen quotas for Mexican films, the sale of its national chain of theaters, 
and the deregulation of ticket prices, which immediately doubled. The results of this 
transition are open to interpretation. Some, following neoliberal dogma, have pro-
claimed it a great success, citing the industry’s overall growth, since it now occupies 
the fourth place worldwide in the number of screens and tickets sold; improved pro-
duction values; and the international acclaim the films have received. Others deem 
it a categorical failure. Cinema, they claim, has become big business in Mexico, but 
mostly for transnational corporations that have inundated the market with Hollywood 
films, leaving most Mexican films, even those that have earned international 
awards, mostly unseen by Mexican audiences. Even graver is the fact that cinema 
has become just one more consumer good, accessible only to a minority of the popu-
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lation, and has practically given up any aspirations it once might have had of being 
an expression of Mexico’s cultural diversity.
Güeros (2014) is a kind of paradoxical film that supports both sides of this argu-
ment. A product of the Mexican neoliberal film industry in many ways, it is, as an 
internationally prize-winning film, a feather in its cap, confirming the superior qual-
ity of today’s Mexican films as compared to those produced before the neoliberal 
transition. On the other hand, Güeros offers a stark critique of the effects of neoliberal-
ism on Mexican society, emphasizing the social fragmentation that has left its people 
almost completely devoid of political agency. This critique extends to the Mexican 
film industry as well, which the film comments on through a series of episodes that 
subtly parody the formulaic strategies it has used to pander to its middle- and upper-
class audiences, exposing it as just one more self-serving consumer industry that ped-
dles conservative ideology as a commodity. 
What follows is an attempt to understand the effects that 25 years of neoliberal-
ism –policy and ideology– have had on the Mexican film industry, as well as the 
challenges facing those who would like to alter the course. I will begin, in Section 
One, with a brief review of neoliberalism’s history and ideological underpinnings. 
Section Two gives an account of the neoliberal transition of the Mexican film indus-
try, both as it pertains to its material conditions of production and exhibition, as well 
as to its content. Finally, Sections Three to Five are an analysis of some aspects of 
Güeros that will help illuminate the topic at hand. 
neolIberAlIsm: hIstory, polIcy, And Ideology
Before turning to the Mexican film industry, I will briefly go over a few aspects of 
neoliberalism that will be useful for our analysis. Beyond its main tenets, policies, 
and history, which I will mention only briefly, I will focus on its ideological under-
pinnings. More than just a set of policies, neoliberalism is a world view, with its own 
idiom and metaphors through which we interpret our daily lives. It is these ideo-
logical features that will allow us to understand the motives and justifications for the 
Mexican film industry’s neoliberal transformation. For the task of reviewing neoli be-
ralism’s history, as well as revealing its ideological inner workings I will rely heavily 
on Fernando Escalante’s book Historia mínima del neoliberalismo (Minimal History of 
Neoliberalism) (2015).
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Neoliberal History and Policy
Neoliberalism became prominent in the late 1970s with the rise to power of Margaret 
Thatcher in the United Kingdom and Ronald Reagan in the United States, and was 
further facilitated by Deng Xiaoping’s liberal reforms to China’s economy (Har-
vey,-2007: 1); it would soon spread, with very few exceptions, to the rest of the world. 
These policies, as is well known, emphasize free trade, deregulation, privatization, 
and fiscal austerity, all of which are meant to ensure that the free market is allowed 
to flourish without any social or political interference. But, while the “neoliberal mo-
ment” began in the late 1970s, its intellectual history dates back to the 1930s, with the 
writings of Friedrich Hayek, Ludwig von Mises, Walter Lippman, Louis Rougier, 
and others (Escalante,-2015: 28). They were attempting to revitalize the principles of 
classical liberalism,1 but with an economic emphasis, trying to fight the dominant 
collectivist spirit that arose in part due to the Great Depression and which led to wel-
fare interventionist policies like the New Deal. 
In 1947, the Mont Pelerin Society was formed by 36 scholars committed to de-
veloping and promoting this new kind of economic liberalism (Escalante,-2015: 41). 
The society’s purpose was long-term. Their inaugural declaration stated they did 
not align with any political party (Escalante,-2015: 41); they did not want to engage 
in a political fight, but to develop an ideology. It is telling that they chose such an 
anodyne name, providing them with a certain amount of discretion. It is important 
to note –and, given their current dominance, difficult to imagine– that they were 
iconoclasts, outsider radicals who advocated principled, radical ideas at a time when 
a more pragmatic, cautious Keynesianism was the norm.2
Neoliberalism’s time would come, as I mentioned above, in the late 1970s, thanks 
to the deep economic crisis of the 1970s. The increasing military spending of the 
Cold War, coupled with the Vietnam War and an oil crisis that saw the price of a barrel 
soar from US$2 to US$12 in less than two years, put a strain on U.S. finances. Politi-
cally, three presidents (Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon) were caught lying about the 
cost of the Vietnam War. And then there was Watergate. Europe was no better off. In 
Britain, Prime Minister Edward Heath was forced to declare a state of emergency on 
1  Classical liberalism’s troubles go back to the late nineteenth century, since it proved incapable of lifting the 
working class from miserable living conditions (Escalante,-2015: 25). World War I made things even worse for 
liberalism, as governments were forced to intervene to keep production up, thus infringing upon the people’s 
freedoms. The critical moment was the crisis of 1929, which generated massive unemployment, prompting 
governments to use public spending to activate the economy, as exemplified by the U.S.’s New Deal. There 
was a deep distrust of the free market, and collectivist ideas were prevalent everywhere (Escalante,-2015: 
27). It is in this context that Hayek and company felt the need to renew liberalism, turning not to political 
rights, but to the free market as the road to freedom and wealth.
2  Keynesianism advocates a watchful eye from the state, which must intervene in the market to prevent un-
desirable outcomes caused by the private sector.
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four occasions between 1970 and 1974. A million Britons were unemployed and in-
flation was up to 14 percent. Terrorism abounded: in Italy, the Red Brigades; in 
Germany, the Red Army Faction; and in Spain, eta and frap. In the periphery, the pro-
tectionist development model began to fail, and many countries turned to the political 
left, many of their governments openly expressing sympathy toward the Soviet 
Union. In under ten years, the world had radically changed (Escalante,-2015: 94-95).
The stage was set for a change, and neoliberalism fit the bill perfectly, at least in 
the central countries. The general perception was that governments were to blame 
for the crisis: too much spending, too many wars, and too many lies. Neoliberalism 
advocated the exact opposite –at least on the surface–: small government and the 
smallest amount of intervention possible. The youth movements of the 1960s had an 
individualistic ethos that fit in well with these ideas. They were mostly comprised of 
college-educated kids with an unprecedented amount of consumer possibilities in a 
world with too many rules (Escalante,-2015: 100). To them, neoliberalism was a radi-
cal program that meant freedom. The new political left abandoned the classical causes 
of inequality and public welfare and concentrated on personal freedoms, authentic-
ity, and the right to difference (Escalante,-2015: 104). Neoliberalism fed on these 
protests and was able to maintain an anti-establishment character.
With Thatcher and Reagan in power, the 1980s became what Escalante refers to 
as “the offensive.” The U.K. and the U.S. implemented policies of privatization, de-
regulation, and tax and public-spending cuts; and a systematic campaign against 
unions significantly diminished their power. But domestic policy was only the be-
ginning. For the free market to flourish, it needs to expand, and so it was necessary 
that the peripheral countries open their markets as well. They were basically forced 
to by the International Monetary Fund (imf) and the World Bank. In 1979, then-U.S.-
President Jimmy Carter appointed Paul Volcker as Fed chairman; in order to contain 
inflation, he proceeded to raise interest rates from two percent in 1979 to nine percent 
in 1981. This was unmanageable for the countries on the periphery, which had large 
debts. The World Bank and imf would then offer to alleviate their situation by re-
negotiating their debt, but only on condition that they open up their markets to for-
eign capital (Escalante,-2015: 107). In 1991 the Soviet Union collapsed and any 
alternative was effectively gone. Capitalist neoliberalism was perceived as the only 
option. Even the cataclysmic financial crisis of 2008 prompted no substantive changes 
to the new world order. As Frederic Jameson and Slavoj Žižek have famously re-
marked, it has become easier to imagine the end of the world than the end of capital-
ism (Fisher,-2009: 2).
Before ending this very schematic history of neoliberalism, it is important to 
note three important points. First, despite neoliberalism’s discourse about small 
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government and free markets, the neoliberal state does not disappear or remain idle 
at all. On the contrary, its intervention is indispensable for creating and maintaining 
markets, as can be attested by the numerous wars, foreign government overthrows, 
trade agreements, and bank bailouts by the governments of the economic powers. 
But, since these interventions are made in the name of freedom, they are excused. 
Second, despite the market’s globalizing impetus, borders play an essential role in 
making it more efficient, as they allow capital to exploit the different conditions that 
each country has to offer: cheap natural resources in one country, cheap labor in another, 
a tax haven in another, etc. (Escalante,-2015: 183). And the last point concerns the re-
lationship between the economy and democracy. Neoliberal thought exalts the econ-
omy beyond any other discipline, and sees it as the all-important path to freedom 
and prosperity, which means that it cannot be subjected to the caprices of the people’s 
will, leading to a kind of paradoxical state of affairs in which, in order to attain free-
dom, the people must relinquish their freedom to influence economic policy.
Neoliberal Ideology
In the very schematic history of neoliberalism outlined above, one argument relies 
on a very superficial kind of logic. Following Escalante, I pointed out above that the 
neoliberal moment began when the economic crisis of the 1970s was attributed to a 
series of bad government interventions, prompting people to embrace the exact 
opposite of that (at least on the surface), that is, the idea of a non-interventionist neo-
liberal state. But this is faulty –or at least incomplete– reasoning. The opposite of 
“bad X” is usually not “no X”, but “good X.” So an extra argument is needed to go 
from bad results in government intervention to advocating no intervention at all. It 
is not even clear that no intervention should be even considered, as, prima facie, it 
would be hard to believe that doing nothing to foster a good economy, development, 
and social welfare would result in exactly that. This is where neoliberal ideology 
comes in, where the efforts of Hayek and company pay off.
To understand the inner workings of neoliberal ideology, we must begin by un-
derstanding its relationship with neoclassical economic theory, which tries to predict 
economic performance by completely divorcing economic activity from its social 
context. It fundamentally relies on a series of mathematical models used to predict 
supply, demand, prices, employment, etc., which are equally valid in any social con-
text. These models are not derived from empirical research, but from a set of as-
sumptions. The most important of these assumptions is that the individual is a selfish 
agent constantly striving to maximize his own individual profits, with no regard for 
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anything else (Escalante, 2015: 161). This selfishness –or, as economists like to call it, 
rationality– is what supposedly guides the behavior of consumers and suppliers, an 
interaction of millions of individuals’ wills that results in the “optimum” prices, which, 
if kept away from external interference, will lead to an economy in “equilibrium.” 
I have put “optimum” and “equilibrium” in quotation marks because they are 
prime examples of a kind of trick that neoliberalism, through neoclassical economic 
theory, has played on the public. That is, by assigning words with positive connota-
tions to terms that refer to mere possibilities in a mathematical model, neoliberalism 
elevates the market, which is fundamentally just a mechanism to process informa-
tion through the system of prices (Escalante,-2015: 21), into a symbol of freedom, a 
promise of wealth and even a normative system for our moral conduct. In reality, 
from the technical point of view, all that “optimum” and “equilibrium” mean in eco-
nomic theory is that they are the points at which prices stabilize given the economic 
forces in the world; but, to the general public, to common sense, they become desir-
able results. An excellent illustration of this is the existence of what is called the “nat-
ural rate of unemployment,” an implicit acceptance –a naturalization even– of the 
idea that there will always be unemployed people, and that this is part of having an 
optimized economy. When unemployment becomes a good thing, there can be no 
doubt that the academic argument has become ideological (Escalante,-2015: 77).
But there is more. It is not only consumers and suppliers who operate under this 
selfish rationality; according to neoliberalism, it is also public servants. This means 
that all politicians will do whatever they can to maximize their own profits, and that 
the supposed public good that drives them is just something they say to get reelect-
ed. Even if government officials are well-meaning and think they have the public’s 
interest at heart, they are only imposing their ignorance on the market, which is 
the only mechanism that “knows” what is good and fair. The only way to optimize the 
system is to make the public interest coincide with the private interest. Or, in other 
words, there is no public interest; there is only private self-interest. As Thatcher fa-
mously said, “There is no such thing as society; there are only individuals.” 
This is the ideological argument of neoliberalism. On the social level, as we 
have seen, it commands reducing the public sphere in favor of the private, in order 
to not impose our ignorance –or even worse, our own political agendas– on the mar-
ket. But more important, perhaps, are its effects on the individual level, that is, on 
each of our own identities and world views. On a personal level, the market be-
comes the prevailing metaphor through which we interpret the world and relate to it 
(Escalante,-2015: 103); each of us is interpellated as a profit-maximizing agent: homo 
oeconomicus, a sort of personal enterprise in which every one of our actions must be 
evaluated in terms of a cost-benefit analysis of investment and profit. Even our moral 
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codes become imbued with a sort of distorted Darwinism, a kind of survival-of-the-
fittest teleological argument whereby whatever actions we take in our own self-in-
terest are the ones that are economically and morally just. 
This might begin to explain why, despite its less than stellar economic results, 
deteriorating working conditions, and repeated crises, neoliberalism has not been 
seriously challenged. Whatever troubles are encountered are interpreted through 
the neoliberal ideological matrix, which, to no one’s surprise, prescribes more neo-
liberal policies as the solution.
Mexico’s Transition to Neoliberalism
Mexico’s political transition to neoliberalism conforms to the general pattern out-
lined above. As a neighbor of the U.S., this transition was inevitable, and like many 
other countries on the periphery, it was precipitated during the 1980s by a financial 
crisis. This transition was consummated with the enactment of nafta on January 1, 
1994, but its roots go back many years, at least to 1968, with the student movements 
that led to the infamous Tlatelolco massacre. 
Mexico has a long history of strong governments and particularly of strong 
presidents. One political party, the Institutional Revolutionary Party-(pri),3 ruled con-
tinuously from 1929 until 2000, aided by a long series of murky elections. These au-
thoritarian governments were deeply involved in every facet of society, including 
the economy. During the 1950s and 1960s, its protectionist, import-substitution poli-
cy obtained excellent results that reached a sustained growth of 6 percent annually 
(Camp, 2010: 569). Things began to sour in 1968, when violent police intervention in 
a public school ignited a student movement to protest government repression. This 
movement grew from June until October 2, when, pressured by the upcoming inau-
guration of the 1968 Mexico City Olympic Games, the government decided to put a 
stop to the protests with a massacre during a demonstration at the Tlatelolco Plaza, 
in which an estimated 150 to 200 protesters were killed.
This episode was the beginning of the political decline of the Mexican state, but 
its control over the economy continued to increase well into the 1980s (Camp,-2010: 
569). President José López-Portillo’s administration (1976-1982) escalated state expansion 
by financing infrastructure projects with massive, high-interest foreign loans secured 
with Mexico’s proven oil reserves as collateral (Camp,-2010: 571). The crisis came when, 
near the end of his term, oil prices plummeted, leaving Mexico with an overvalued 
3  Originally named the National Revolutionary Party (pnr) and later the Party of the Mexican Revolution (prm). 
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peso and an unmanageable debt at high interest rates. López-Portillo responded by 
nationalizing the banking industry, thus expanding indirect state control over the 
economy to an estimated nearly 80 percent (Camp, 2010: 570), alienating much of 
the business community and sparking anger in the general population, who blamed the 
government for their economic hardships. Just a couple of months later, the imf ap-
proved a US$3.8-billion loan to the Mexican government on the condition that it im-
plement a series of free-market reforms.
López-Portillo’s appointed successor was Miguel-de-la-Madrid (1982-1988), the 
first Mexican president to have studied in the U.S. (at Harvard), and so began the era 
of the technocrats. De-la-Madrid and his advisors believed that the state-led econom-
ic strategy would not solve Mexico’s economic troubles and favored an approach 
stressing foreign capital investment, declining tariffs, and increased trade (Camp, 
2010: 578). After him came Carlos-Salinas-de Gortari (1988-1994), another Harvard 
graduate, who explicitly embraced neoliberalism as the way forward for Mexico. He 
did not have a hard time selling it to the Mexican people, who were tired of a series of 
repressive, inept, corrupt governments. Besides, by then, the Mexican people equated 
economic freedom with democracy and modernity and saw neoliberalism as a 
historical inevitability, a necessary result of an increasingly globalized world 
(MacLaird,-2013: 110).
Salinas-de-Gortari began to negotiate nafta in 1990 and signed it in December 
1992. For most of his six-year term he enjoyed high approval ratings, generating 
wild optimism about Mexico’s future prospects. However, the final year of his term 
was disastrous. First, on January 1, 1994, the same day that nafta went into effect, 
the Zapatista National Liberation Army (ezln) staged an uprising in the southern 
state of Chiapas, taking control of much of its territory.4 Then, in September a promi-
nent Mexican political figure, José-Francisco-Ruiz Massieu, was assassinated, and 
Salinas-de-Gortari’s brother Raúl was prosecuted for the crime. Finally, in December, 
right after he handed power over to Ernesto Zedillo, the peso sharply devaluated, 
showing that all the presumed financial progress was just a façade. Since then, the 
Mexican people have had a complex relationship with neoliberalism: with a kind of 
fatalistic acceptance of the inevitable, they are resigned to passively watch as the coun-
try’s resources and industries are sold and its culture colonized, but all the while 
enjoying what they can of the consumer perks that neoliberalism affords.
4  The ezln uprising is a very telling episode of neoliberalism. The fact that it coincided with the day nafta 
came into force is no coincidence; it was originally designed precisely to protest neoliberal economic policy 
on behalf of the indigenous people, who were being left behind. However, the ezln quickly turned away 
from its original Marxist language and its complaints against government agrarian policies and the privatiza-
tion of communal lands and toward a defense of indigenism, a cause that was easier to digest for an interna-
tional community very much aligned ideologically with the neoliberal economic project (Escalante,-2015: 187).
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In 2000, the pri finally lost a presidential election; however, somewhat inexplica-
bly in a country with such a high degree of economic inequality, it lost to the right-
wing National Action Party-(pan). In any case, by then, elections did not matter that 
much anymore, at least when it came to economic policy; neoliberalism was already 
deeply engrained in Mexico, and no serious challenges to it have emerged since. The 
neoliberal offensive continues, with the few remaining bastions of public life con-
stantly under attack. Recent advances have been made in the energy industry, where 
Pemex, Mexico’s state-owned oil company, recently opened up to foreign invest-
ment, and, as I write this, on the all-important education front, the teachers union in 
the southern state of Oaxaca are on strike, protesting a new reform that implements 
standardized tests for all teachers and strips them of their tenure. They enjoy little 
support from a population that equates unions with corruption and inefficiency.
the mexIcAn fIlm Industry’s trAnsItIon 
to neolIberAlIsm
Up until the late 1980s, the state was heavily involved in the Mexican film industry, 
an unacceptable –and soon to be illegal– state of affairs under neoliberalism. And so, 
from 1988 to 1994, it underwent a complete transformation in all its facets –produc-
tion, exhibition, consumption, and film content– until it complied with both nafta’s 
legal requirements, and, perhaps more importantly, with neoliberalism’s ideological 
dictums. The following is a brief account of this transformation.
Privatizing a National Cinema
Before neoliberalism came to Mexico, its film industry was almost entirely controlled 
by the state. In the field of production, a private sector existed that was exclusively 
dedicated to producing very low-brow fichera and masked-wrestler films,5 but any 
film with any kind of artistic intentions was, if approved, completely financed by the 
state. Exhibition-wise, a few private theatres existed, but most of them belonged to 
Compañía-Operadora-de-Teatros,-S.A.-(cotsa), nationalized in 1961 (MacLaird,-2013: 
24). The government regulated ticket prices, keeping them affordable, and there was 
a 30-percent screen quota for Mexican films.
5  Ficheras are prostitutes who work in bars as taxi dancers, servicing clients for money. Picaresque comedies 
featuring them became a very large sub-genre of Mexican films in the 1970s and 1980s.
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Due to a series of bad administrations, the results of this arrangement went 
from bad to worse. After the Golden Age of Mexican cinema, in the 1940s and 1950s,6 
the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s were a complete disaster. Each president appointed his 
own people to run the film industry as they saw fit, without any regard for continuity. 
For example, while President Luis Echeverría (1970-1976) appointed his brother Raúl, 
who invested in the expansion of the National-Cinematographic-Bank (ncb), opened 
the National Cinematheque, and gave ample support and freedom to young direc-
tors, with some good results, López-Portillo, his successor, undid all the progress 
when he appointed his sister Margarita, who dissolved the ncb, neglected the Cine-
matheque to the point that it burned down in a fire, and “supervised” production so 
as not to allow “coarse themes that poison the mind” (Mora,-1997: 63). In general, film-
makers complained about the prevalent cronyism that, sadly, seemed to confirm the 
warnings of neoliberal ideology about the politicians’ conduct regarding the public 
well-being, not to mention producers’ widely reported practice of embezzling from 
the funds earmarked for production (Mora,-1997: 50). 
Adding to this mismanagement of the industry, the advent of video and cable 
television in the 1980s resulted in the middle and upper classes largely abandoning 
cinemas,7 except for the sporadic Hollywood blockbuster. There was no longer a 
narrative capable of unifying the public into a national audience like it did in the days 
of the Golden Age (Sánchez, 2014:-Intro.,-par. 9), perhaps a reflection of a society in-
creasingly fragmented by social and economic divisions.
It was in this context that Salinas-de-Gortari’s neoliberal privatization project 
was accepted without much resistance; Congress passed his 1992 Federal Film Law 
spearheading the change in 20 minutes (MacLaird,-2013: 27). But the transition had 
already begun a few years earlier, in preparation for nafta’s 1994 deadline. The film 
law’s main impetus was privatization and deregulation. It did not go completely 
private, as neoliberal orthodoxy would want, because its Article 14 still recognized 
that film production is an activity of “national interest” –more on this later–; however, 
it greatly diminished the role of the state in production. Where previously it would 
completely finance films, now it would only “facilitate the initial development of 
projects and promote finished projects as national culture, but not have creative con-
trol or financial responsibility for the productions” (MacLaird-2013,-p.27). In other 
6  The Golden Age was aided by World War II, which saw a drop in production in the U.S. and Europe, as well 
as in Argentina, allowing Mexican cinema to dominate the Latin American markets. Also, Mexico’s film 
industry received financial support from the U.S. State Department in exchange for anti-Axis propaganda 
in its content (MacLaird, 2013: 24).
7  Sánchez-Prado reports that between 1989 and 1991, 10 082 video clubs opened across Mexico (2014: Intro., 
par. 2).
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words, the state, through its Film Institute (Imcine), would provide partial funding, 
but only if the project had already obtained private backing, a kind of free market 
seal of approval for the project’s financial viability.
Later, in 2007, a new law allowed private companies to contribute funds to the 
production of certain government-approved film projects and deduct their contribu-
tions from their income tax. This resulted in films’ increased commercialization, in-
cluding brand and product placements. Also in 2007, a law was passed approving a 
one peso tax on each movie ticket bought in Mexico, which would go toward Mexi-
can film production; however, this law never went into effect, as the Motion Picture 
Association of America (mpaa) sued, arguing that it violated nafta. The proposed 
legislation was ultimately deemed “unconstitutional” by the Federal-Commission-for 
Regulatory Improvement, an agency whose policy objectives were initiated under 
Salinas-de-Gortari to facilitate deregulation and privatization (MacLaird,-2013: 30). 
In short, while the government does still provide some public funding for produc-
tions, filmmakers have been left to their own devices in trying to secure most of their 
financing from the private sector. The result is what has been characterized as a “post-
industrial cinema,” that is, one made up of individual –sometimes heroic– efforts 
to get funding, as opposed to an established infrastructure geared to sustained and 
continuous production (MacLaird,-2013: 2).
However, the most significant change in the industry had nothing to do with 
production or funding, but with exhibition. One of nafta’s provisions mandated that 
the screen quota for Mexican films gradually come down to 10 percent, and in 1993, 
the government sold cotsa, the national theatre chain, to the private sector and de-
regulated ticket prices. The expectation was that the theatres would be renovated, 
but most of them were sold and changed use, and the chain was eventually disman-
tled in 1994 (Saavedra-Luna,-cited-in MacLaird,-2013: 28). In their place, upscale 
multiplexes with state-of-the-art seating and projection equipment were built, most of 
them in affluent urban neighborhoods, often inside shopping malls. Prices doubled 
and are no longer affordable for the lower classes (MacLaird, 2013: 28). In recent 
years, gentrification has intensified, with many multiplexes offering only vip theatres 
“with amenities such as all-leather individual recliners with side tables, a full bar, an 
extensive food menu (which can be ordered from waiters summoned by a button 
next to the seat), and a comfortable lobby that resembles a posh café” (Sánchez, 2014: 
conclusion, par. 1). Post-1992, cinema in Mexico has ceased to be identified as a cul-
tural experience, to become, for the most part, an experience of consumption for 
those who can afford it.
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Audience and Content Shifts
Higher ticket prices, the gentrification of cinemas, and their concentration in urban 
areas caused a radical shift in film audiences, excluding most of the population. As 
of 2012, only 28 percent of Mexico’s inhabitants went to the cinema at least once 
a year, and people who live away from large urban areas –42 percent of the popula-
tion– were left without a cinema nearby (MacLaird, 2013: 46).8 This radical shift in 
audiences –from the lower to the middle and upper classes– was accompanied by a 
shift in the content of the films produced in Mexico, with post-1992 films unasham-
edly catering to the interests of the new, more affluent audience. As often happens in 
privatization processes, whatever censorship there was under state production is 
substituted by an –often more conservative– kind of market censorship. Three 
major trends in this direction have been identified: the proliferation of romantic 
comedies; a new sort of neo-Mexicanism that aims at re-writing Mexican history from 
an upper-class point of view; and films that feature sensationalistic and apoliti-
cal violence. Inevitably, this content shift has ideological consequences; it is worth a 
brief analysis.
Romantic Comedies
The romantic comedy is a genre that allows an evasion of national identity issues by 
centering its plots largely on issues of intimacy and romance (Sánchez,-2014: ch. 2,-
sec. 2,-par. 2). Its appearance in Mexico in the 1990s was partly due to its popularity 
in Hollywood during the 1980s, but it is also a manifestation of the audience shift 
mentioned above and a new growing neoliberal identity. As with their Hollywood 
counterparts, Mexican romantic comedies are usually centered on affluent urban 
middle class characters with jobs related to advertising or media. The films are char-
acterized by Misha MacLaird as
possessing a light tone, quick pace, urban settings, thirtysomethings of middle- to upper 
class standing, familiar and sentimental themes, conflicts regarding sexuality or parental 
figures, superficial levels of narrative and character reflection, permissible social critique 
of corruption and crime, drugs and excessive sex as vices, modern foreground showcasing 
8  This does not mean that the remaining 72 percent of the population does not watch movies at all, as the pirate 
market in Mexico is huge, and largely tolerated by the authorities. But the preferences of this “pirate audi-
ence” are not taken into account by producers, and this not reflected in the content of their films, as they do 
not receive any income from their viewing.
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an abundance of visible commercial brands and consumer technology (cds, computers, 
etc.), and a backdrop of picturesque and folkloric Mexico.-(MacLaird, 2013: 48)
The film that launched the genre in Mexico was Alfonso Cuarón’s first feature 
Sólo con tu pareja (1991), centered on a publicist’s sexual escapades. Despite an abun-
dance of sexual activity and nudity, the deeper tone of the film is quite moralistic, as 
the main character is punished for his promiscuity and finally redeems himself by 
renouncing his former lifestyle and finding true love. The publicist would become a 
ubiquitous character in these films, “a trade clearly related to the new economic con-
figurations of neoliberalism” (Sánchez, 2014: ch. 2, sec.3,-par. 3), a reflection of a new 
understanding of citizens as consumers (Sánchez, 2014: ch. 2, sec.3,-par. 3). Beyond 
providing Mexico’s more affluent classes with films that reflected their own privi-
leged perspectives, romantic comedies managed “to playfully present the impact of 
nafta on Mexico’s middle class as a central concern, yet managing to reconcile a co-
existence of U.S. business culture with family-centered traditions and values” 
(MacLaird,-2013: 26).
Neo-Mexicanist Films
If romantic comedies aimed at providing light entertainment and escape, neo-Mexi-
canist films tried to re-engage cinema’s affluent audiences with Mexico’s culture and 
traditions by basically re-writing Mexico’s cultural history from their own point of 
view. Through superficially optimistic and teleological narratives that portray the 
past –including its hardships– as the inevitable road to a better future, these films make 
Mexican cultural history easy to digest, not only for Mexico’s elites, but also for in-
ternational audiences (MacLaird,-2013: 26).
The most successful of these films was Alfonso Arau’s Like Water for Chocolate 
(1992), a film that offers a romanticized gastronomic version of Mexico’s history, from 
the revolution of 1910 up until Mexico’s symbolic marriage to the U.S. with the sign-
ing of nafta (Sánchez, 2014:-ch. 1,-par. 14). The film portrays the story of a rich fami-
ly of women living in a border town as they survive the revolution with all their 
privileges intact, including the undying loyalty of their servants. This survival is 
portrayed as well-earned: when the revolutionaries come to their door asking for a 
donation of provisions for the cause, the mother of the family scares them off with her 
rifle, telling them that they can take whatever is in the barn (barely anything, as it 
turns out), but the house provisions are “for her own private cause,” and that if they 
try to enter her house she will shoot them, as she has a very bad temper. The only 
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thing that the family loses to the revolution is a daughter, who falls in love with a 
revolutionary and runs off with him to become a revolutionary herself. She might be 
claimed as a progressive feminist character: however, she would be an odd one, as 
she comes back in the 1930s for the wedding of her niece (who is marrying a U.S. 
American) in a Model T (a symbol of social status) and married to her revolutionary 
(Sánchez, 2014:-ch. 1,-sec. 1,-par. 9). Near the end of the film, we are surprised to learn 
that the story is being narrated from the present, by the grandaughter of one of the 
daughters, still privileged, and still cooking traditional Mexican dishes, just like her 
forebears used to.
“Revolutions wouldn’t be so bad if you could eat at home with your family ev-
ery day,” says the revolutionary daughter when she comes back, thus managing to 
embed bourgeois family values within a violent, social revolution. Sánchez-Prado 
sums it up well: “The revolution in Arau’s movie is never an issue of class inequality, 
but rather a guarantee that social change in Mexico, like the one brought about in the 
1920s or the one taking place in the late 1980s, never threatens the status of the privi-
leged” (Sánchez, 2014: ch. 1,-sec. 1,-par. 11). A comforting message for an affluent movie 
audience to hear in a country that seems to be in permanent need of social change.
Sensationalistic Violence and the Politics of Fear
Since the beginning of the government’s war on the drug cartels in 2006, Mexico has 
become the host of a series of brutal, even unimaginable, acts of violence, but even 
before that, Mexican cinema had been attracting audiences with hyperrealist, styl-
ized depictions of violence, to the point that it has become a formulaic subgenre of 
Mexican cinema (MacLaird, 2013: 102). It is sometimes thought that films depicting 
violence are necessarily political and usually progressive, as they delve into the 
depths of social reality, but this is not always the case. Historically, Mexican cinema’s 
representations of violence had usually been acts of resistance by the lower classes 
against injustice or by women against violence. More recently, however, they have 
focused on urban crime and corruption (MacLaird,-2013: 103). This is violence seen 
as a threat to consumer privilege from a middle- and upper-class perspective, a result 
of what Sánchez-Prado has called the “citizenship of fear,” in which politics are not 
about social justice, but about “the systemic failure of the Mexican state in preserv-
ing the spaces of modernity enjoyed by the new movie-going audience” (Sánchez, 
2014:-ch. 3,-sec. 1,-par. 4).
The most obvious example of this trend is a box office hit called Todo el poder (Gimme 
the Power) (2000). Its plot begins when middle-class tv newsman Gabriel is robbed while 
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reporting about rampant crime in Mexico City. In the next scene he is robbed again, 
along with all the clientele of the restaurant where he is eating. As he seeks help from 
the authorities, he finds out that the policeman who is helping him is corrupt and works 
in tandem with the thieves. As he goes up the ladder of power, he discovers that the 
attorney general himself is part of the corruption scheme. In the end, though, with the help 
of his girlfriend Sofía, they unmask everyone and are set free to prosper –Gabriel, we 
are told during the credits, strikes it rich by making tv commercials. The first thing 
to note is that the film’s depiction of crime in Mexico City is –certainly before 2006– a 
wild exaggeration, more the result of bourgeois paranoia than a reflection of reality. 
But more importantly, in the world of Todo el poder, “Crime is not a result of social 
inequality, but of individual and institutional corruption” (Sánchez, 2014: ch. 3,-sec. 4, 
par. 11), and no real structural changes are called for; all it takes for everyone to prosper 
is some good private citizens to care enough to stop government corruption.
Also in 2000, Amores perros, the most expensive and critically acclaimed Mexican 
film ever, was released. Despite a progressive exterior, it is nothing more than an ex-
pression of this same citizenship of fear, as Sánchez- (2006) successfully argues. 
Particularly striking is the way in which El Chivo, one of the main characters, is 
punished for leaving his family to join a revolutionary group striving to “make the 
world a better place.” The film never bothers to question whether his cause was just; 
all violence is treated as an apolitical infringement of family values.
Together, romantic comedies, neo-Mexicanist films, and sensationalistic violence 
perform an ideological shift to match the audience shift, placing the middle-class urban 
subject as the privileged witness of the contemporary (Sánchez, 2014:-ch. 3, sec. 1,-
par. 1). No longer an instrument for social change, ideology is commodified for con-
sumption by the new neoliberal audiences. Post-1992, Mexican films are no longer 
about national identity or cultural expression; they are just one more consumer good.
The Mexican Film Industry “Optimized”
The award ceremony of the 2016 Arieles (Mexico’s Academy-Awards) began with a 
speech by Mexican Minister of Culture Rafael-Tovar-y-de-Teresa, who proclaimed 
Mexican cinema to be in good shape. He boasted that, in 2015, 140 films had been 
produced in Mexico, a number unrivalled since the Golden Age of Mexican cinema; 
he also praised their quality, stating that they had been awarded 450 international 
prizes. He then proceeded to congratulate the audience –full of actors, directors, and 
film executives– as they were, he claimed, responsible for this success. The audience 
clapped, presumably in agreement. 
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Later in the broadcast, the Ariel de Oro, the Academy’s maximum honor, given 
in recognition of a notable career in film, was presented to Paul Leduc, a director 
who came to prominence during the 1970s with a series of anti-establishment films. 
After thanking the Academy, he read a speech that served as a stark rebuttal of 
Tovar-y-de-Teresa’s optimistic assessment. He did not contradict any of his num-
bers, but added a few, which support a very different interpretation of the current 
state of the Mexican film industry. He began by clarifying that, of the 140 films pro-
duced, only 46 were features, many fewer than the 80 features produced in 1945. But 
the more significant difference is that the films of the Golden Age were actually 
watched by the Mexican public, while most of today’s productions will remain prac-
tically invisible. Cinema, he continued, is a very profitable business in Mexico, but 
not for Mexican filmmakers. While Mexican film companies struggle to generate an-
nual revenues of Mex$15 million, Twentieth Century Fox and Universal Pictures ex-
ceeded Mex$1.5 billion each, and Warner and Disney surpassed Mex$ 2 billion each.9 
In the three preceding years, Leduc noted, overall box office grew, but in that same 
period, attendance to Mexican films fell to almost half, from 30 to 18 million tickets 
sold. International awards are being won, but those very films are not being shown 
in Mexican cinemas, or even on Mexican tv, private or public. All the while, the gov-
ernment continues to turn a blind eye to the numerous violations of the 10-percent 
screen-time quota set for Mexican films. This avalanche of numbers, he continued, 
demands we ask why this is so and who it benefits, concluding by asking state offi-
cials to clarify what exactly the cinema project is that they are trying to advance. In 
what amounted to a kind of schizophrenia, the crowd, composed of the same people 
who had applauded the now-rebutted official version, gave him a standing ovation.
By many statistical measures, Mexican cinema’s transition into neoliberalism is 
a resounding success. Mexico has the largest Spanish-language audience and the 
fourth-largest film market in the world. With the multiplex system, between 1994 
and 2011, the number of screens more than tripled, from 1 432 to 4 818, and audienc-
es more than doubled, from 82 million to 189 million (MacLaird,-2013: 34). In 2015, 
this growth placed Mexico in fourth place worldwide in both the number of screens 
(Canacine,-2016: 25) and in cinema tickets sold (Canacine,-2016: 23). Mexican films 
have improved in production resources, as the average budget per film grew from 
Mex$940 000 (about US$94 000 at the time) in 2000 to Mex$22.4 million (about US$2 
million) in 2012 (Sánchez, 2014: concl.,-par. 2). A “star system” has developed, with 
many world-renowned Mexican actors and directors working at home and in 
9  Actually, his figures fell short of reality. The 2015 Canacine report boasts about a new box office record at-
tained by Universal, with over Mex$3 billion, followed by Fox at Mex$2.8 billion and Paramount and Dis-
ney slightly over Mex$2 billion.
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Hollywood, some even winning Oscars; and, in general, Mexico’s film industry has 
gained international recognition.
On the other hand, as Leduc pointed out, a problem exists with the domestic 
exhibition of Mexican films. In an industry flooded with Hollywood films, Mexican 
films accounted for only 5.3 percent of the total box office (Canacine, 2016: 17), and, 
as I pointed out above, most of the Mexican population has been excluded altogeth-
er from attending cinemas. Those who can attend overwhelmingly choose Holly-
wood films, and the Mexican films that do get seen are not the expression of national 
culture, but mostly one more consumer good for the middle and upper classes. So 
Leduc’s question is worth answering: What is the point of all this growth? Is it just 
about economics? Or is there still a culturally significant national cinema project?
Neoliberal ideology, as we know, has its answer: the market has processed 
everyone’s rational preferences and told us which films should be produced, what 
their content should be, and which should be exhibited, where, and at what price. 
And the results are clear: the Mexican people want mostly Hollywood films, with a 
few ideologically conservative Mexican films mixed in, shown in multiplexes in af-
fluent urban areas, many of them in vip theatres with food service. The problem with 
the –lack of– exhibition of Mexican films is simply the result of government interfer-
ence; excessive production resulting from the government’s partial funding of films 
that the free market has not fully approved. As soon as this interference stops, the 
market will reach equilibrium. Furthermore, the 72 percent of the Mexican people 
who have stopped going to theatres are not being excluded; they have just freely and 
rationally decided that they would rather invest their money in some other consum-
er good. This percentage should be interpreted as a necessary percentage for the in-
dustry to be optimized, something akin to the natural rate of unemployment, but for 
consumption. And finally, economic growth is always good; it means that people are 
finding more consumer satisfaction through cinema. Any other idea of what is good 
is an imposition of our ignorance on consumers’ freedom; there is no such thing as 
the public interest, there is only individual interest, and it is being maximized by the 
free market. In case we needed someone to spell out this answer for us, Jack Valenti, 
head of the mpaa at the time of the signing of nafta did so. After Canada obtained a 
cultural exemption from nafta to protect its film industry10 –an exemption that 
Mexico did not ask for– Valenti insisted that “this [debate] has nothing to do with 
culture. . . . [This] is all about the hard business of money” (Valenti,-quoted in Larrea, 
1997: 1124).
10  MacLaird reports that this exemption never made much of a difference, as Canada suffers the same imbal-
ance in distribution as Mexico (2013, p.36).
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There is, of course, another very different answer to the question, one that is, 
presumably, part of the motivation for Leduc’s speech and for the audience’s stand-
ing ovation. It hinges on the possibility of something having value that is not re-
flected by consumer choice; in this case, on cinema having a cultural value that 
escapes our individual consumer decisions, and more specifically on national cine-
ma having cultural value to the nation. Ironically, this is exactly what the 1992 Law 
of Cinematography –the law that spearheaded the neoliberal transition– explicitly 
states in its Article 14:
National cinematographic production constitutes an activity of public interest, without 
this undermining its commercial and industrial character, for it expresses Mexican culture 
and contributes to the strengthening of the bonds of national identity between the diffe-
rent groups that make it up. Thus, the state will foster its development in order for it to 
fulfill its function of strengthening the multicultural composition of the Mexican nation, 
through the funds specified by Law. (pef, Segob, 1992,-Article-14)
Following this rationale, Mexican cinema has a serious deficit, and whatever 
growth it has managed under neoliberal policies has not been in the right direction. 
The “multicultural composition of the Mexican nation” cannot be strengthened by 
the myriad of Hollywood films shown in our cinemas, or by the 5 percent of Mexi-
can films that do get seen, when they are seen by –and filmed for– only 28 percent of 
the population. 
And so, there appears to be a political conflict between the Mexican govern-
ment’s cultural objectives and the conditions stipulated by nafta. However, despite 
appearances, not much conflict exists at all. Article-14 is nothing more than a bit of 
demagoguery planted in the middle of an utterly neoliberal law. All the articles in 
the law that actually matter, that determine the material conditions of the industry, 
obey neoliberal dogma. Theatres were privatized, screen quotas for Mexican films 
reduced, and prices deregulated. The only provision of the law that infringes on the 
free market is funding for national productions, and it is actually a reduction over 
previous levels; but, more importantly, it is ultimately ineffectual when it is not 
matched by legislation to guarantee their proper exhibition. Furthermore, no one in 
the Mexican government is advocating a renegotiation of nafta or trying to obtain a 
cultural exemption.
Perhaps more important than the question of whether a conflict exists between 
Mexico’s government and nafta’s conditions is whether an actual ideological con-
flict exists (beyond the sporadic rhetoric like Leduc’s speech) between the Mexican 
people and its government’s policies on cinema. That is to say, after so many years of 
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neoliberalism, is there still a national culture that we want protected from interna-
tional capital? And would we be willing to trust our government with this protec-
tion? And if we did, and if it did resolve the problems of film exhibition, would the 
content of Mexican productions be substantially different –less conservative– from 
the current content? And if it were, how many of us would go and watch them? In 
other words, do we still have a cultural identity that is substantially different from 
the one we have been consuming from Hollywood and other international cultural 
outlets for so many years? Or have we been colonized for too long? And, of course, 
then the difficult question arises of who is the “we” in this last series of questions.
The schizophrenia displayed by the audience at the Arieles might serve as a 
perfect metaphor for the ideological questions I just posed. The fact that Leduc’s 
speech refuted Tovar-y-de-Teresa’s does not necessarily mean that the applause for 
either of them was insincere. The audience reaction to Leduc was more enthusiastic, 
probably responding to a more effusive, nationalistic sentiment, but the one for 
Tovar-y-de-Teresa jibed more with their work and their lives in a neoliberal film in-
dustry, under a neoliberal national economy, in a neoliberal world order from which 
we do not really know the way out –institutionally, or even in our own imaginations.
brIef overvIeW of Güeros
I now turn my attention away from neoliberalism and the Mexican film industry in 
general, and to the analysis of Güeros. Before a deeper analysis, it will be useful to 
briefly describe its production, reception, and plot, and about how the analysis of the 
film fits within the larger structure of this article. 
Production
Like most recent Mexican films, Güeros is a co-production, financed in part by private 
enterprise, in this case, Catatonia Films, a small Mexican production company with five 
full-length films to its credit –none since Güeros–, and supported also by public funds, 
through Conaculta (the Mexican equivalent of a Ministry of Culture), and by Difusión-
Cultural-unam, the cultural arm of the same university whose strike is portrayed in the 
film, and which opened its campus for the film to be shot on location. Even with all 
three entities chipping in, the film’s budget was a modest Mex$2 240 00011 (slightly 
11  As reported in the Diario Oficial de la Federación, Mexico’s official national gazette, found online at http://
www.dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?codigo= 5383762&fecha=27/02/2015.
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under US$200 000 at the time of production). It is the first feature film by Alonso 
Ruizpalacios, who has a background in theatre, and who, in true auteur fashion, co-
wrote it with Gibrán-Portela.
Exhibition and Reception
The film was first shown in March 2014 at the Berlinale, and continued on the festi-
val circuit until March 2015, when it was released in Mexico on 48 screens across 
32 cities12 (Imcine,-2016: 86). Well-liked by Mexico’s cultural elites, it became the 
most attended Mexican film of 2015 at the National Cinematheque (Imcine,-2016: 
96). However, although it won the most prizes of any Mexican film in 2014, a total of 
16 international awards and 5 Arieles, including best picture, outside that circuit, it 
did not manage to draw in large audiences. It sold a total of 55 530 tickets and 
grossed Mex$2 479 145 (less than US$200 000), placing it in twenty-fourth place for 
Mexican films in 2015 (Imcine,-2016: 72). It was distributed in six countries, includ-
ing the U.S., where it grossed a very modest US$60 000. It is now out on dvd and 
Blue-Ray and also available to stream on Netflix Mexico.
Plot
The plot of Güeros centers on its main character, nicknamed Sombra (Spanish for 
shadow), who is a student at the National Autonomous University of Mexico (unam) in 
Mexico City, which is in the middle of a student strike in reaction to the government’s 
plans to begin charging tuition. He lives with fellow student Santos and is visited by 
his younger brother, Tomás, sent to him by their mother from the coastal state of Ve-
racruz, because of bad behavior. Sombra is in love with Ana, an upper-class student 
who is very involved in the strike and has a radio program in the striking students’ 
radio station. 
Tomás finds Sombra and Santos in a kind of paralysis: they are supposed to be 
writing their dissertations, but they are not doing it; they never leave their apart-
ment, so they have not paid their electricity bills and are forced to steal electricity 
from their neighbors; they support the strike, but do not attend the student demonstra-
tions. This inactivity is wreaking havoc on Sombra, who is beginning to suffer from 
12  Not a high number, considering that there are more than 100 cities in Mexico with populations of 100 000 
or more.
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panic attacks. All of this changes when they are forced to flee their apartment because 
the neighbor catches them stealing his electricity. From this point on, the film be-
comes a road movie, with Sombra, Santos, Tomás, and eventually Ana embarking on 
a quest to find Epigmenio Cruz, an obscure rock and roll figure from the 1960s who 
Tomás listens to obsessively, as his father did before him. Epigmenio is dying alone 
from cirrhosis of the liver in a small hospital, but, they claim he could have changed 
Mexican rock and roll forever. Their quest to find him takes them on a tour of Mexico 
City that passes through a lower class neighborhood, where they have a potentially 
dangerous encounter; a student assembly at the university, where Ana joins them; an 
upscale party populated by the very hip community of artists and intellectuals; the neigh-
boring town of Texcoco, where they finally find and talk to Epigmenio Cruz; and finally, 
back to Mexico City, where they find themselves in the middle of a student protest.
Their encounter with Epigmenio is the climax of the film. After Epigmenio an-
grily refuses to autograph Tomás’s audio cassette, Sombra explains who they are and 
why they have come looking for him, an introspective speech that reveals the heal-
ing effects that the road trip has had on him; he now appears ready to move again. 
Later, in the car, he and Ana talk about the prejudices that have kept them from 
getting together and finally kiss. Back in Mexico City, they find themselves in the 
middle of a student demonstration. Ana immediately gets out of the car and joins it; 
after some hesitation, Sombra does too.
Why Güeros?
Güeros is not a typical neoliberal film; it does not fit neatly into any of the categories 
outlined above, so it will not serve as one more illustration of them. This is not to say 
that it has managed to escape neoliberalism. It is a neoliberal film in many ways: it 
clearly targets a sophisticated middle- and upper-class audience; it is crafted as an 
auteur film featuring black and white cinematography reminiscent in style of the 
French New Wave; it played in 15 international film festivals before opening in Mex-
ico; it is set in Mexico City; its protagonists are middle-class and educated; it is a 
comedy with a light tone, and a romance is in the middle of its plot.
What is interesting about Güeros is that it is a neoliberal film that is aware of its 
own condition and struggling to transcend it. This struggle is manifested in two 
main ways. First, its plot attempts a criticism of neoliberal policy and its effects on 
Mexican society. Its focus on the state of mind of its protagonists –rather than on the 
actual political struggle– serves to illustrate the all-important ideological dimension 
of neoliberalism. Secondly, through a series of self-referential episodes, the film 
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seeks to address the state of the Mexican film industry, its recent neoliberal malaise, 
and its own place within it. I will try to unpack these two manifestations in Sections 
4 and 5, respectively.
lookIng for epIgmenIo cruz: from the 1960s 
polItIcAl rebellIon to the 1990s polItIcAl pArAlysIs
The central topic of Güeros is political agency, and, more specifically, political agency 
in Mexico in the time of neoliberalism. The plot is set against the student strike, but 
the film’s real focus is not on the political struggle, but on the students’ state of mind. 
That is to say, it is not about the fight against neoliberalism as policy –an outside en-
tity– but against neoliberalism as ideology, the enemy within, existing in the mind of 
each member of a society that has been living under it for so long.
Collectively, the film portrays in-fighting and disagreements among the students. 
These range from divergences about the goals of the strike –while some want to con-
centrate on very specific demands regarding the university, others want to turn it into 
a broader social movement– to divisions rooted in class and gender –when Ana 
gives a speech at the students assembly, she is subjected to shouts of “shut up you 
classist bitch!” and “striptease!” But the main focus is on Sombra and Santos, who 
seem to have internalized these collective divisions and find themselves paralyzed 
in many ways: politically, despite their support for the strike –Sombra shudders at 
Tomás’s suggestion that they are scabs– they do not attend the student protests; in 
Sombra’s words, they are “on strike from the strike.” Sentimentally, Sombra is in love 
with Ana, but does nothing about it; academically, they are supposed to be writing 
their dissertations, but instead we watch as Sombra steadily presses the “delete” key 
on his dissertation file; and physically, they never leave their apartment, to the point 
that their electricity has been cut due to non-payment. They sit around, trying –and 
failing– to learn to do magic tricks and watching Big Brother on tv. Santos tries to 
scrape the fungi off the soles of his feet, and even has a Bartleby moment, when 
asked by Tomás why he doesn’t just change universities, he replies, “I’d prefer not 
to.” Sombra is doing even worse; all this stasis is having an effect on him, as he has 
frequent panic attacks, for which he is prescribed –in true neoliberal fashion– a vaca-
tion: “Go to the beach with your girlfriend.” Escape, don’t engage.
The whole country appears to be feeling the debilitating effects of neoliberal-
ism. In Veracruz, Tomás’s mother has to work as a seamstress –presumably sewing 
clothing that will end up being exported to the U.S.–, so she has no time to watch 
him; the last straw of his bad behavior is when he tosses water-filled balloons at a 
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mother and baby from the roof of his house. In Texcoco, a different group of kids 
emulate this behavior by tossing bricks from a bridge; as in Tomás’s case, their par-
ents are nowhere to be found. All around, the family appears to have disintegrated 
–Ana cannot talk to her parents, and Sombra only talks to his mother when he needs 
money–, and no other social structure is there to pick up the pieces; the state is no-
where to be found and everyone is left to his or her own devices. The only presence 
of a state official is a cop who signals at Sombra and Santos to stop. But cops are not 
to be trusted, and as they try to get away from him, a wrong turn of the wheel takes 
them into a bad neighborhood where the unknown awaits –one of the consequences 
of marginalization and social fragmentation. Later, Tomás meets a lone migrant 
from Central America who expresses his gratitude at the opportunities that Mexico 
has afforded him: cross a border, become a different part of the chain of production; 
the essence of neoliberalism.
A clue to the roots of Sombra and Santos’s paralysis is given to us via a recur-
ring piece of idle conversation. It is on the topic of breakfast: after embarking on a 
brief catalogue of the different types of breakfast there are –English, Mexican, stu-
dent breakfast– they come to “continental breakfast,” which sparks some anger in 
Santos, who gripes, “What the fuck are they talking about? What continent? It’s like 
saying that it’s the breakfast of people over there. Who are they over there? And who 
are we here?” Continental breakfast is a product of capitalism and urbanization. In 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, as people moved into cities and 
took jobs that required less physical stamina, the full, calorie-filled breakfast was re-
placed by a light continental breakfast. It is unclear if the film is making symbolic 
use of this somewhat obscure origin, but even if it is not, their annoyed reaction still 
remains at being subjected to a classification that comes from outside and makes lit-
tle sense. Similar complaints appear again in the context of the strike, when their 
road trip accidentally takes them to the university and they are not allowed into the 
assembly until a friend vouches for them and lets them in; a discussion ensues about 
the exclusivity of the strike, and how certain groups seem to think they own it. Som-
bra and Santos’s malaise seems to spring from a sense of social fragmentation and 
the ensuing impossibility of creating a truly collective movement, rendering any 
possible social activism ineffectual. This theme is emphasized by the film’s title. Lit-
erally translated, the term “güero” means “blonde,” but it is widely used to refer to 
people of higher social class, regardless of their hair and skin color. That is why San-
tos gets angry when a security guard at a party calls them “güeros,” even though 
only Tomás has light hair, and Sombra is in fact very dark skinned.
This stagnant situation is finally alleviated by two events. First, Tomás’s arrival 
from Veracruz. He represents a younger, more active Sombra. He still listens to Epigmenio 
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Cruz, like Sombra and their father used to, an indication that Sombra’s paralysis is 
not a character trait, but the result of a process that has slowly eaten away at his true 
idealistic self. Tomás is constantly pressuring Sombra and Santos to leave the apart-
ment, particularly when he finds out that Epigmenio is dying alone in a hospital and 
wants to go seek him out. They still will not budge, and it is not until the second mobi-
lizing event –their neighbor coming after them after realizing they were stealing elec-
tricity from him– that they are finally forced to leave. It is then that the film changes 
from stasis to road trip; even the camera is visibly shaken from its tripod and put 
in motion.
The road trip is a quest to find Epigmenio. He represents the 1960s and the 1968 
student movement, and he acts in the film as both a symbol of political agency –1968 
and the Tlatelolco massacre are still the main reference point when it comes to social 
protest in Mexico– and a question regarding the relationship between the 1999 strike 
and the 1968 movement. We never get to hear Epigmenio’s music. They only listen 
to it on an old Walkman, and all we hear is the grind of the gears as they rotate the 
cassette tape. He remains idealized, just as 1968 has. No actual music could have 
lived up the obscure figure who “could have changed Mexican rock and roll forever” 
and who, “they say, made Bob Dylan cry.” But while the search for him symbolizes 
their own search for political agency, there is an ironic element in their relationship 
to the 1968 movement. While the 1968 protesters demanded more freedom from an 
oppressive government, their 1999 counterparts were advocating for the exact oppo-
site, that is, for the government to remain involved in keeping education free and 
public. As noted above, the 1960s youth movement’s individualistic spirit played 
into the hands of neoliberalism, and, ironically, today’s paralysis might be, in some 
small part, the result of yesterday’s rebellion.
In the end, as often happens –and has perhaps become commonplace–, what 
matters is not the destination, but the road. By the time they find Epigmenio in a 
lonely Texcoco saloon, their experiences –and just the act of moving– seem to have 
had a healing effect on Sombra. Predictably, Epigmenio is a complete disappoint-
ment, but he provides an opportunity for Sombra to show us how much he has man-
aged to understand. After Tomás (young Sombra) is dismissed by Epigmenio, 
Sombra takes charge, with a determination that we have not seen before, as he gives 
the climactic speech of the film. He introduces himself as Federico, using his real 
name instead of his shadowy nickname, and tells him that they have come because 
for the last six months he has not been able to sleep or to leave his apartment. They 
used to listen to his music with their father, but back then he did not understand his 
lyrics; now he does. He understands what his father understood, “that in life you’ll 
run into a bunch of assholes who don’t understand anything, that can’t see beyond 
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the surfaces . . . but that as long as you have that, as long as you can see beyond the 
surface, then no one can take that away from you, that feeling.” His speech contin-
ues, saying that his father used to say that if the world is a train station, poets are not 
the ones coming and going, but the ones who stay behind watching the trains leave, 
and that he, Epigmenio, is one of those poets who watches the trains leave. After 
that he slides over his cassette for him to sign, but Epigmenio does not react; they 
think he might be dead, but he is only sleeping.
In light of this speech, we may ask, what is it exactly that Sombra has come to 
understand? What is it that turned him from a shadow of himself back into Federi-
co? Given the run-up to the encounter, we would think that, whatever it is, it would 
be the film’s proposed solution to the political paralysis afflicting Mexican society, 
and an answer to the question regarding the relationship of today’s political activ-
ism with the activism of 1968. But Sombra’s speech sounds a lot more poetic than 
political. It is more about witnessing than doing, about protecting an inner part of 
ourselves from what is going on outside. 
So, in the end, is Güeros just another neoliberal conservative film that prompts 
us into retreating from collective action and into personal growth? A fatalistic exhor-
tation to stay at the train station and poetically and passively observe as the country 
and the world go down the drain? It certainly is not a revolutionary film pointing 
the way toward a specific social movement, but I would like to think that it is not 
conservative either, just very modest –perhaps justifiably so– in its progressive po-
litical ambitions. The way I see it, despite appearances to the contrary, Sombra’s 
speech is political. It is aimed at those who do recognize the tragic consequences of 
neoliberalism, and it is an exhortation not to despair; or to despair, but not fall into 
paralysis because no solution seems to be in sight. So, if Güeros is not a revolutionary 
film, it at least defends the value of witnessing; if it is not a recipe for political revolu-
tion, at least it is an exhortation to not give up completely. Perhaps this answer had 
already been given to us, much earlier, when Sombra asks Tomás why they should 
go and look for Epigmenio, to which he replied, “Because no one else will.” The end 
of the film seems to validate this reading. In the car ride back to Mexico City, Sombra 
and Ana start to kiss, a personal reward for Sombra’s re-activation; but when they 
suddenly find themselves in the middle of a student protest, Ana gets out of the car 
and joins it without hesitation or even a pause for Sombra to join her. Sombra hesi-
tates, but finally joins the march as well. The message is clear, romantic love was 
never the ultimate goal of Sombra’s journey; regaining his political mobility was. 
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Güeros As A metA-cInemAtIc commentAry 
on the mexIcAn fIlm Industry
As I mentioned above, Güeros engages neoliberalism in two ways. The first is by rep-
resenting its paralyzing effects on political agency; and the second, to which I now 
turn, is through a series of self-referential episodes that aim at commenting on the 
current state of Mexican film industry and on Güeros’s own place within it. In what 
follows, I will try to show that this self-referentiality is not gratuitous, but is closely 
linked to Güeros’s political ambitions. A film that wants to address social fragmenta-
tion but is only going to be watched by one of those fragments has a basic problem. 
Güeros is –as it had to be in order to exist– a film aimed at the social elites, and so, in a 
certain way, it is part of the problem. As such, it faced the need to talk about itself, 
about the audience watching it, and about the film industry that it is part of. This is 
achieved partly through a couple of self-referential episodes, and partly through a 
constant interplay with some of the genres that have become typical of neoliberal 
Mexican cinema.
This interplay begins in the very first scene. The first character to appear on 
camera is a hysterical woman, pleading with her baby to stop crying. As the phone 
keeps ringing, she is frantically putting clothes inside a suitcase and getting ready to 
leave. As she hits the street, we can see she has a black eye. But, as we –the audience– 
start to get ready for what seems to be an intense domestic-violence melodrama, a 
water-filled balloon falls from the sky and hits the baby right on the head. The point 
of view of the camera then switches, and we watch from above as Tomás is dis-
mayed by having hit the baby. We then follow Tomás as he tries to get away, and the 
mother and baby are never heard from again in the film, except for a brief moment, 
when Sombra asks him what happened to the baby, to which he dismissingly replies, 
“He’s fine.”
With this switch, the film tells us, right from the beginning, that there is some-
thing it doesn’t want to be. By doing so, it manages two things: first, to insert it-
self as a film into the universe of topics that it wants to address, and second, it 
launches what will be a constant dialogue with film genres, through which it will 
manage to talk about the Mexican film industry and its recent vices. In this first epi-
sode of this dialogue, it is not important what exactly it is that it doesn’t want to be 
–domestic violence melodramas are not the most typical of recent Mexican films–; 
what matters is the typicality of the situation portrayed: the crying baby, the bat-
tered mother, the hysteria of the situation accentuated by the ringing phone. This 
typicality seems formulaic, just as Mexican cinema –and neoliberal cinema in gen-
eral– has become. 
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A second episode of this interplay deals with the citizenship of fear, mentioned 
above. It begins when, during their road trip, they take a wrong turn and quickly 
end up in a bad neighborhood. When they come to a dead end and want to back up, 
a group of lower-class youngsters who had been playing football on the street block 
their way. Sombra immediately mutters, “Nooo,” in a fatalistic tone of voice that 
conveys that this was to be expected –a typical situation. But what ensues in not re-
ally typical. One of the youngsters “offers” to help them find the main road if they 
give him a lift, but before they have a chance to answer he unlocks the door and gets 
in the car. Throughout the ride, the camera focuses closely on Sombra’s nervous 
face, with the youngster blurred in the background. In a sardonic tone of voice, the 
youngster asks Tomás: “What is it güerito [diminutive for güero], are you really afraid 
of me?” and laughs. He then tells them that his friends were going to kill them, add-
ing, “What do you think about that?” But, despite the veiled violence in his tone, he 
only asks them to buy a round of beers. As he forces them to drink, he watches some-
what incredulously and giggles, as if surprised by his own power over them. As 
they finish the first round, and he goes to the store to get the second, Sombra, Santos, 
and Tomás frantically escape, leaving him behind. Afterwards, Tomás is upset and 
needs to vomit, so Sombra tries to calm him down by telling him that the youngster 
was only trying to make friends. When Tomás stares at him in disbelief, Sombra 
shrugs and says, “Well, maybe.” 
The truth is that we are not sure what to make of this whole episode. The lower 
class youngster obviously was not trying to make friends, but he was not that men-
acing either; he was quite skinny and had no kind of weapon. The real force at play 
here was middle-class fear of the lower classes. The film is careful not to interpret the 
violence encountered, cleverly creating a contrast with the recent sub-genre of films 
that exploit the politics of fear, thus pointing a finger, once again, at the social frag-
mentation that is behind these formulaic expressions of fear. A similar effect is 
achieved by Tomás’s encounter with a migrant from Central America. Tomás –and 
we with him– listens to his story, but never offers a reply. Another reminder for the 
film’s audience that Mexico is a very diverse place, and we do not get to experience 
or understand most of it.
Then there are two explicitly self-referential moments. First, when they go to 
the university for the student assembly, as they are talking to Oso, one of their fellow 
students, Santos –or maybe I should say, the actor playing Santos– suddenly asks 
him, “What do you think about the script of the movie?” We then see the clacker and 
film crew as he replies, “Frankly I don’t like it, as I’ve told you many times before. 
It’s just a chase movie, and what I don’t understand is how it is that you guys are the 
heroes.” Later, at a very posh party full of very hip, pretentious, and affluent young 
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people, apparently artists, we overhear conversations about film festivals and com-
plaints about how Mexico is viewed abroad. Ana is welcomed by her fellow upper-
class people, but Sombra, Santos, and Tomás are ignored and decide to step outside. 
Once outside, Sombra rants about Mexican cinema: “Fucking Mexican cinema. They 
grab a bunch of beggars, shoot in black and white, and say they’re making art films. 
And the fucking directors, not satisfied with the humiliation of the Spanish Con-
quest, now go to the Old World and tell French critics that our country is full of pigs, 
derelicts, diabetics, sellouts, thieves, frauds, traitors, drunks, and whoremongers 
with inferiority complexes.” Santos replies that Mexico is full of all that, and Sombra 
agrees, but complains that if they are going to humiliate us, they should do it with 
their own money and not with public funds. Tomás then asks, “Have you seen the 
film?”, clearly referring to Güeros itself. 
These two episodes serve the purpose of destroying the illusion created by the 
film’s plot, and getting the audience to think about Güeros from outside its fictive 
world, as a film in itself and a product of the Mexican film industry. Sombra’s rant 
serves as a complaint about an industry seemingly dominated by rich hipsters who 
use Mexico as a commodity to be packaged and sold to European audiences –in oth-
er words, about neo-Mexicanism. But the rant is not meant to put Güeros above the 
fray; on the contrary, the reference to shooting in black and white, as Güeros is, is 
there to make sure it is included as a film that uses public funds and premieres at in-
ternational film festivals.13 Moreover, Oso’s stated displeasure with the script, and 
particularly with its choice of heroes, points to the unfairness of an industry that in-
variably sanctions the middle class as the privileged witnesses of our times, even 
when they are represented by a couple of lazy youngsters who steal electricity from 
their neighbors and a mischievous balloon thrower.
But more important than putting down the film industry –or the film itself as 
part of it– is what the mere presence of these references –hopefully– achieves: get-
ting the audience to think of itself as part of the problem, maybe even as its root. 
Sombra, Santos, Tomás, and Ana are very likeable characters with whom the audi-
ence is meant to identify, and despite the contrast established with the hipsters at the 
posh party, they are repeatedly –to their dismay– called “güeros.” On one occasion, 
when a security guard (a member of the lower class) calls them “güeros,” Santos gets 
agitated and complains to him about this designation, pointing at Sombra, who is 
very dark skinned, and asks him if he is a güero. Very matter-of-factly, the guard 
answers, “Yes, he is.” And he is right; socially and culturally speaking, if we are 
inside a cinema or projected on the screen, we all are; and, as long as that is the case, 
13  Of course, it could be argued that precisely by acknowledging this, Güeros is claiming to be above the fray, 
but that is another issue.
166 (DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.20999/nam.2017.a005)
Jacobo asse Dayán
norteamérica
neoliberalism will succeed in its reduction of cinema to one more consumer good, 
utterly incapable of articulating any kind of cultural expression that could seriously 
challenge it.
conclusIons
More than just a set of policies, neoliberalism is an ideology that affects the subjec-
tivity of those living under it. After almost 40 years of neoliberal hegemony, a grow-
ing minority has begun to realize that its market “equilibriums” are not really 
optimal for the majority of the people. Its conflation of citizen and consumer has 
fragmented society and done away with any kind of collective ethos, leaving people 
in a state of extreme precariousness and political isolation. And yet, reversing course 
away from neoliberalism is a difficult proposition, as neoliberal ideology has made 
any alternative hard to even imagine. 
The case of the Mexican film industry is a prime example of this. From 1988 to 
1994, it underwent a complete overhaul to comply with nafta’s neoliberal dictums. 
Formerly state owned and operated, it underwent a process of privatization and de-
regulation that saw its ticket prices double, its cinemas gentrify, and its audiences 
shift from the lower to the upper classes, with a content shift to match. The effective 
exclusion of 72 percent of the Mexican people from its cinemas is one more element 
contributing to the further stratification of society, by extending the marginalization 
of the lower classes from the economic realm to the cultural and political. And yet, 
despite some discordant voices, the material conditions of the industry prevent any 
real change, as production and exhibition of films hinges upon them being finan-
cially approved by the market.
Güeros is a good illustration of this situation. Anti-neoliberal in spirit, it had no 
choice but to conform to the neoliberal market and adopt its strategies. Forced to 
elaborate its critique from within a neoliberal shell, the result is an interesting para-
dox that uses self-reference to comment on the Mexican film industry and on itself, 
in an attempt to recognize its own limits as a neoliberal film and to point the finger at 
the deficiencies of the film industry. Definitely not a revolutionary film, Güeros is, at 
best, a sign of a growing consciousness about the ill effects of neoliberalism on Mexi-
can society and its film industry, and at worst, an illustration of the very effective 
limits that neoliberalism and its free market imposes on any kind of expression of 
dissention.
167
Güeros: Social Fragmentation, Political agency
contemPorary iSSueS
bIblIogrAphy
camp, r.
2010 “The Time of the Technocrats and Deconstruction of the Revolution,” in Wil-
liam H. Beezley and Michael C. Meyer, eds., The Oxford History of Mexico, 
New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 569-597.
canacine
2016 “Resultados definitivos 2015,” http://canacine.org.mx/wp-content/uploads/ 
2014/04/Resultados-Definitivos-2015-ATI-1-1.pdf.
escalante, f.
2015 Historia mínima del neoliberalismo, Mexico City, El Colegio de México.
fisher, m.
2009 Capitalist Realism: Is There No Alternative?, London, Zero Books.
harvey, d.
2007 A Brief History of Neoliberalism, New York, Oxford University Press.
imcine
2016 Anuario Estadístico de Cine Mexicano 2015, Mexico City, Imcine.
larrea, t. a.
1997 “Eliminate the Cultural Industries Exemption from nafta,” Santa Clara Law 
Review, vol. 37, no. 4, pp. 1107-1150.
maclaird, m.
2013 Aesthetics and Politics in the Mexican Film Industry, New York, Palgrave Mac-
Millan.
mora, c. 
1997 “Mexican Cinema: Decline, Renovation, and the Return of Commercialism, 
1960-1980,” in New Latin American Cinema, vol. 2, M. Martin, ed., Detroit, 
Wayne State University Press.
pef, segob (poder eJecutivo de la federación, secretarÍa de gobernación)
1992 “Ley Federal de Cinematografía,” Mexico City, Poder Ejecutivo de la Federa-
168 (DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.20999/nam.2017.a005)
Jacobo asse Dayán
norteamérica
ción, Secretaría de Gobernación (pef, Segob), December 29, Diario Oficial de la 
Federación (doF), http://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/ref/lfc/LFC_
orig_29dic92_ima.pdf.
sánchez prado, i.
2014 Screening Neoliberalism: Transforming Mexican Cinema, 1988-2012 [Kindle ver-
sion], Nashville, Tennessee, Vanderbilt University Press.
2006 “Amores perros: Exotic Violence and Neoliberal Fear,” Journal of Latin Ameri-
can Cultural Studies, vol. 15, no. 1, pp. 39-57.
fIlms cIted 
Amores perros, directed by Alejandro G. Iñárritu, Mexico, Altavista Films-Zeta Film, 
2000.
Como agua para chocolate, directed by Alfonso Arau, Mexico, Arau Films Internacional-
Aviacsa-Cinevista-Fonatur-Fondo de Fomento a la Calidad Cinematográfi-
ca-Gobierno del Estado de Coahuila-Instituto Mexicano de Cinematografía 
(Imcine)-Secretaría de Turismo, 1992.
Güeros, directed by Alonso Ruizpalacios, Mexico, Catatonia Films-Conaculta-
Difusión Cultural unam, 2014.
Sólo con tu pareja, directed by Alfonso Cuarón, Mexico, Esperanto Filmoj-Fondo de 
Fomento a la Calidad Cinematográfica-Instituto Mexicano de Cinemato-
grafía (Imcine)-Sólo Películas, 1991.
Todo el poder, directed by Fernando Sariñana, Mexico, Altavista Films, 2000.
